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OPTIMIZATION INCENTIVES AND COORDINATION
FAILURE IN LABORATORY STAG HUNT GAMES
BY RAYMOND BATTALIO, LARRY SAMUELSON, AND JOHN VAN HUYCK1
1. INTRODUCTION
THE SPECIFICATION OF THE FEASIBLE strategies and preferences that define a strategic-form
game, together with the assumption that players are substantively rational, provides a
powerful framework for analyzing strategic behavior. This framework in turn can be
summarized by the game’s best-response correspondence. For example, one need only
know the best-response correspondence of a strategic-form game to identify its Nash
equilibria. The classical approach to games typically either exploits only the information
contained in the best-response correspondence, or augments this information with
risk-dominance and payoff-dominance considerations in order to choose between strict
Nash equilibria.2
This paper reports an experimental investigation of three stag hunt games. The three
games have identical best-response correspondences as well as similar payoff magnitudes,
but produce different behavior.
Games 2 R, R, and 0.6R, shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3, were used in the experiment. In
each game, strategy X is a strict best response to any mixture that attaches a probability
greater than q* to X, where q*0.8, while Y is a strict best-response to any mixture
attaching a lower probability to X. Each game has two pure-strategy equilibria, where
Ž . Ž .X, X is payoff dominant and Y, Y is risk dominant, as well as a mixed equilibrium in
which X is played with probability q*.
Our analysis of games 2 R, R, and 0.6R is motivated by the observation that the
pecuniary incentive to select a best-response to an opponent’s strategy is twice as large in
game 2 R as it is in game R and six tenths as large in game 0.6R as it is in game R. We
call this incentive, given by the difference between the payoff of the best response to an
opponent’s strategy and the inferior response, the optimization premium. The optimiza-
tion premium may be irrelevant to substantively rational agents, but we expect people to
more readily learn to play a best response when the optimization premium is large, and
expect the differing optimization premia of games 2 R, R, and 0.6R to induce systemati-
cally different play in laboratory experiments.
1 We thank Menesh Patel, Bill Rankin, and Nick Rupp for research assistance, Simon Anderson,
John Kagel, Jack Ochs, Richard McKelvey, and John Nachbar for helpful discussions, Dan
Friedman, Robert Forsythe, Paul Straub, Martin Sefton, and their collaborators for making their
data available to us, and two referees for helpful comments. Eric Battalio implemented the
experimental design on the TAMU economic research laboratory network. The National Science
Foundation and the Texas Advanced Research Program provided financial support. The first draft of
this paper was called ‘‘Risk Dominance, Payoff Dominance, and Probabilistic Choice Learning,’’
which was drafted while Van Huyck was on faculty development leave at the University of
Pittsburgh.
2 Ž . Ž .Hillas 1990 introduces a reformulation of Kohlberg and Mertens’ 1986 strategic stability that
makes the exclusive reliance on the best-response correspondence particularly obvious. Among
Ž .theories that make an equilibrium selection in the stag hunt game, Carlsson and van Damme 1993
Ž . Ž .and Harsanyi 1995 choose the risk-dominant equilibrium, while Anderlini 1999 and Harsanyi and
Ž .Selten 1988 choose the payoff-dominant equilibrium.
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X Y
X 45,45 0,35
Y 35,0 40,40
FIGURE 1.Game 2 R.
X Y
X 45,45 0,40
Y 40,0 20,20
FIGURE 2.Game R.
X Y
X 45,45 0,42
Y 42,0 12,12
FIGURE 3.Game 0.6R.
To the extent possible, games 2 R, R, and 0.6R involve payoffs of similar magnitudes.
In particular, the expected payoff from the mixed equilibrium is 36 for all three games.
One can think of the optimization premium as describing the steepness, rather than the
level, of the payoff function near an equilibrium. A larger optimization premium implies
that the penalty for inferior play is larger.
Our experimental results provide evidence that changing the optimization premium
influences behavior. The sensitivity of individual subjects to the history of opponents’ play
is greater in games with a larger optimization premium. Behavior converges more quickly
in game 2 R than in R, and more quickly in game R than in game 0.6R. The
payoff-dominant equilibrium is more likely to emerge the smaller is the optimization
premium.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment consists of three treatments. Each treatment consists of eight cohorts.
Eight subjects participated in each cohort. Each cohort plays one of the three games,
either 2 R, R, or 0.6R, seventy-five times. We used a single-population random matching
protocol to pair subjects within a cohort. The subjects were informed that they were
being randomly paired.
The subjects had common and complete information about both their own and
everybody else’s earnings table. Actions were labeled 1 and 2, and each subject chose one
such action in each period. After their choices were made, the subjects were randomly
paired with an anonymous opponent to determine an outcome for each pair. Since
outcomes were reported privately, subjects could not use common information about the
outcomes in previous periods to coordinate on an equilibrium.
Cell entries in Figures 1, 2, and 3 denote the number of cents earned by a subject pair
for each action combination in each round. Earnings were presented in matrix form and
subjects were instructed on how to derive the other participant’s earnings from the
earnings table.
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No preplay communication was allowed. Messages were sent electronically on a
PC-network.
The subjects were recruited from undergraduate economics classes at Texas A&M
University in the Spring of 1996, Fall of 1997, and Spring of 1998. A total of 192 subjects
participated in the experiment: eight cohorts of eight subjects in three treatments. After
reading the instructions, but before the session began, the subjects filled out a question-
naire to determine that they understood how to read earnings tables.3 A session lasted
about two hours. Repeated play of the payoff-dominant equilibrium for seventy-five
periods results in a subject earning $33.75.
3. OPTIMIZATION INCENTIVES
Games 2 R, R, and 0.6R differ in the penalty attached to not playing a best-response
or, more optimistically, in the premium for playing a best-response. We refer to this
Ž .incentive as the optimization premium. Let  X, q denote the expected payoff to aj
player in game j who plays X and expects his opponent to play X with probability q. Let
Ž . Y, q be similarly defined for Y. Then the optimization premium for game j is thej
Ž .  function r q : 0, 1  given byj
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .r q  X , q  Y , q 50 qq*  qq* ,2 R 2 R 2 R 2 R
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .r q  X , q  Y , q 25 qq*  qq* ,R R R R
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .r q  X , q  Y , q 15 qq*  qq* ,0.6R 0.6 R 0.6 R 0.6 R
where  is the optimization premium parameter. Hence, for any opponent’s strategy q,j
the optimization premium is twice as large in game 2 R as it is in game R and six tenths
as large in game 0.6R as it is in game R.
Our intuition is that the process attracting players to choose best-responses will be
more effective in games in which the optimization premium is larger. To make this
precise, consider the following probabilistic choice model that can be derived axiomati-
Ž Ž .. Ž Ž .cally see Luce 1959 or from a random utility framework see Maddalla 1983 and
Ž ..Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse 1992 :
Ž Ž ..exp  X , qjŽ .p q , , j  ,Ž Ž .. Ž Ž ..exp  X , q exp  Y , qj j
Ž .where p q, , j is the probability that X is chosen, given q and , in game j, and  is a
precision parameter. We can solve for the logistic-response function
Ž Ž ..exp  qq*jŽ .p q , ,   .j Ž Ž ..1exp  qq*j
If  equals 0, players mix equally over all strategies, while  sufficiently large gives
essentially best-response behavior. Holding  constant, subjects’ behavior will be more
responsive to q in game 2 R than in game R and in game R than in game 0.6R, since a
3 The instructions for the experiment are available on the web at ‘‘erl.tamu.edu’’ or
‘‘www.ssc.wisc.edu larrysam’’.
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larger optimization parameter  gives a logistic-response function closer to the best-j
response function:4
HYPOTHESIS 1: Subjects’ behaior will be more responsie to beliefs the larger is the
optimization premium parameter.
Ž .Following Fudenberg and Levine 1998 , we can use the logistic-response function to
define a single-population continuous-time logistic-response dynamic,
Ž .qp q , ;  q ,˙ j
where q is reinterpreted as the frequency of action X in the population and it is assumed
that the population is sufficiently large as to allow the random individual choices to be
captured by a deterministic population equation.5
Figure 4 illustrates this dynamic for the case of 1. For any finite 0, the
magnitude of the change in the population state q, and hence the speed of convergence,
differs by optimization premia.
HYPOTHESIS 2: Behaior will conerge to an equilibrium more quickly the larger is the
optimization premium.
This result is typical of noisy belief-based models in which players react more
vigorously to beliefs when payoff differences are larger. Common models of population
behavior based on deterministic or stochastic generalizations of the replicator dynamic
similarly assume that rates of adjustment are increasing in the current difference in
Ž Ž .payoffs between strategies for example, Binmore, Gale, and Samuelson 1995 , Borgers
Ž . Ž ..and Sarin 1997 , or Weibull 1995 .
Fixing , a logit equilibrium is a fixed point of the two players’ logistic-response
Ž Ž ..functions McKelvey and Palfrey 1995 . The stationary states of the single-population
logistic-response dynamic correspond to symmetric logit equilibria.
Figure 4 graphs the logistic-response dynamic for the case of 1. For comparison, it
also graphs the single-population continuous-time best-response dynamic, which is the
same for all three games. Games 2 R and R have three logit equilibria that are close to
the best-response equilibria, with the ‘‘risk-dominant’’ equilibrium having a larger basin
of attraction in the case of game R than game 2 R, and with both basins of attraction
being larger than in the case of the best-response dynamic.6 Game 0.6R has a single logit
Ž .equilibrium given 1 , which is close to the risk-dominant equilibrium, and whose
basin of attraction comprises the entire state space.
4 A growing literature examines models of behavior in games. Rather than a complete model of
adaptive behavior, our goal is to answer the question, ‘‘Does the optimization premium matter?’’,
which is most effectively answered within the context of the logit response function.
5 Ž . Ž .Crawford 1995 examines an alternative belief-based dynamic. Borgers and Sarin 1997 ,
Ž . Ž . Ž .Binmore and Samuelson 1997 , Binmore, Gale, and Samuelson 1995 , Erev and Roth 1998 , and
Ž .Roth and Erev 1995 model current actions as functions of previous experience, with favorable
experiences reinforcing the tendency to take an action. In practice, beliefs are typically estimated as
Ža function of previous outcomes, bringing the two types of model closer together see Hopkins
Ž .. Ž .1999 . More general models include Camerer and Ho’s 1999 experience-weighted attraction
Ž .model and Stahl’s 1996, 1999 rule-learning models.
6 This observation is a consequence of the way the logit equilibrium close to the mixed
Ž Ž ..equilibrium changes as players become imprecise in their responses Fudenberg and Levine 1998 .
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Ž .FIGURE 4.One population continuous time best-response and logistic-response dynamics 1 .
For any finite 0, the basin of attraction of the logit equilibrium closest to the risk
dominant equilibrium expands as the optimization premium falls, until a sufficiently low
optimization premium is reached that there is a single logit equilibrium, closer to the
risk-dominant than the payoff-dominant equilibrium. If we think of some fixed distribu-
tion governing the initial condition of the dynamic, then the effect of probabilistic choice
is to make the payoff-dominant equilibrium less likely than in the case of best-response
dynamics, and less likely as the optimization premium is smaller.
This result is somewhat counterintuitive. Learning is likely to be noisy. We would
expect a smaller optimization premium to increase the likelihood that noisy learning
induces the population to enter the basin of attraction of the payoff-dominant equilib-
Ž . 7rium X, X . A variety of forces may be behind this result, one of which is captured by
Ž .the aspiration-and-imitation model of Binmore and Samuelson 1997 . In their model,
players are more likely to revise their strategies whenever their payoffs fall below an
aspiration level. Learning is thus noisier when payoffs are smaller, and the population is
more likely to stumble away from the neighborhood of an equilibrium if the latter
involves relatively low payoffs. Hence, whenever the risk-dominant and payoff-dominant
equilibria differ, the learning process is more likely to cause the proportion of the
population playing strategy X to move away from the relatively low-payoff risk-dominant
equilibrium than from the payoff-dominant equilibrium, and this difference is more
7 When the optimization premium is smaller, we expect considerations other than expected-payoff
calculations to become more important in shaping behavior. Analysis is likely to give way to
behavioral rules and payoff consequences are likely to be assessed not by calculation but by
experimentation, in the form of simply playing a strategy to see what happens. Learning thus
becomes noisier.
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CONTINGENCY TABLE I
TREATMENT BY PERIOD 1 SUBJECT CHOICE
X Y Total
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.6R 41 0.64 23 0.36 64 1.00
Ž . Ž . Ž .R 45 0.70 19 0.30 64 1.00
Ž . Ž . Ž .2 R 34 0.53 30 0.47 64 1.00
Ž . Ž . Ž .Total 120 0.63 72 0.37 192 1.00
CONTINGENCY TABLE II
TREATMENT BY PERIOD 75 SUBJECT CHOICE
X Y Total
Ž . Ž . Ž .0.6R 28 0.44 36 0.56 64 1.00
Ž . Ž . Ž .R 16 0.25 48 0.75 64 1.00
Ž . Ž . Ž .2 R 3 0.05 61 0.95 64 1.00
Ž . Ž . Ž .Total 47 0.24 145 0.76 192 1.00
pronounced the smaller is the optimization premium.8 This leads to a prediction that is
not made by best-response, logistic-response, or replicator dynamics:
HYPOTHESIS 3: Behaior is more likely to conerge to the payoff-dominant equilibrium the
smaller is the optimization premium.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1. Treatment Behaior
In period 1, 63 percent of the subjects play X, the payoff-dominant action. Risk
dominance is thus not a salient deductive selection principle, though not enough subjects
focus on payoff dominance to make playing the payoff-dominant action a best-response,
since 0.63 is less than q*.
Contingency Table I, crossing treatment, and subject choice in period 1, can be used to
test the hypothesis that initial behavior did not vary by treatment. The Chi-square
statistic is 4.1 which, given 2 degrees of freedom, has a p-alue of 0.13. Hence, subjects’
slight tendency to initially play the payoff-dominant action more frequently when the
optimization premium is smaller is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
The insignificant difference in initial behavior across treatments grows to a large
treatment effect by the end of the session. Contingency Table II shows that in period 75,
only 5 percent of subjects in treatment 2 R play action X, while 44 percent of subjects in
8 Ž .Similar considerations appear in the heterogeneous-payoff model of Myatt and Wallace 1997 .
Ž . Ž .In contrast, Kandori, Mailath, and Rob 1993 and Young 1993 use evolutionary arguments based
on the best-response function to select the risk-dominant equilibrium of a stag hunt game,
Ž .regardless of the optimization premium, while Robson and Vega-Redondo 1996 use a similar
Ž .model to select the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Friedman 1996 suggests that a population may be
more likely to move away from the risk-dominant equilibrium as a result of subjects’ efforts to
‘‘teach’’ others that the payoff-dominant equilibrium would be better, though this intuition contrasts
Ž . Ž .with the theoretical results of Ellison 1997 . See also Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2000 , and compare
Ž .Van Huyck, Cook, and Battalio 1997 .
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TABLE III
THE AVERAGE CHANGE IN x GIVEN x
Treatment 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.6R 0.55 0.38 0.10 0.078 0.27 0.03 0.34 0.20 0.16
R 0.23 0.18 0.22 0.14 0.40 0.37 0.15 0.19 0.32
2 R 0.07 0.26 0.46 0.16 0.50 0.57 0.38 1.75
treatment 0.6R are still playing action X. The payoff-dominant action is thus more
prevalent in games with smaller optimization premia.
To gain some insight into the dynamics behind these outcomes, let state x denote the
number of subjects choosing action X in a cohort in a period. It ranges from 0 to 8.
Table III reports the average of the change in x, denoted by x, for each state and
 4treatment. For every x in the interval 2, 3, 4, 5 , larger optimization premia are associ-
ated with average changes whose absolute values are larger, though two of the changes
appear to go in the wrong direction in the case of state 3. In contrast, for states near the
risk-dominant equilibrium, the largest average changes are attached to the 0.6R treat-
ment, which exhibits a strong tendency to move away from the risk-dominant equilibrium.
This suggests that something beyond the considerations captured by the logistic choice
model, such as an aspiration-based desire to avoid exceptionally low payoffs, is at work,
pushing the population toward the payoff-dominant equilibrium when the optimization
premium is small.
Figure 5 supplements Table III by reporting the count for each value of x that goes
into the average change in x. The figure is truncated at 4, because no value of x ever
changed by more than 3 from one period to the next. Figure 5 shows that no value of x
is perfectly absorbing. However, in treatment 0.6R, the state with the largest count for
x0 was state x8, the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while for the other two games
the largest count for x0 was at state x0, the risk-dominant equilibrium. This
pattern remains if we normalize the counts by dividing through by the number of times
each state x arose in a treatment.9
4.2. Cohort Behaior
Our analysis of the results by treatment suggests that initial behavior varies little
across treatments, but experience teaches subjects to play the risk-dominant action more
effectively the larger the optimization premium. In this section, we examine the data by
cohort to develop an understanding of how this happens.
Table IV reports the initial and terminal outcome by cohort. All 24 of the cohorts start
Ž .in the basin of attraction of the risk-dominant equilibrium Y, Y . Three 0.6R cohorts,
four R cohorts, and five 2 R cohorts implement an equilibrium in period 75. This
observation is consistent with hypothesis 2: cohorts with a larger optimization premium
were more likely to have converged to an equilibrium by the end of the session.
9 If we examine states near the best-response separatrix in Figure 5, that is, states x6 and
Ž .x7, we do not find that movements toward the payoff dominant equilibrium upward are
Ž .especially likely when the optimization premium is small compare the 0.6R and R cases . Because
our games have identical mixed-equilibrium payoffs, differences in the behavior predictions of the
aspiration and imitation model, across optimization premia, disappear as the population approaches
the separatrix.
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FIGURE 5.Change in x, x, as a function of x all periods by treatment.
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TABLE IV
RANKING OVERALL FREQUENCY OF X BY COHORT
Overall
Initial Terminal Frequency Average Per
Game Cohort Outcome Outcome of X Rank Capita Earnings
0.6R 1 0.500 0.375 0.540 20 $19.67
a0.6R 2 0.750 1.000 0.803 21 $27.35
a0.6R 3 0.750 1.000 0.930 23 $31.31
0.6R 4 0.750 0.250 0.397 17 $16.31
0.6R 5 0.750 0.125 0.508 19 $19.39
0.6R 6 0.500 0.375 0.218 13 $12.59
0.6R 7 0.625 0.375 0.343 16 $14.76
0.6R 8 0.500 0.000 0.213 12 $12.86
R 9 0.750 0.125 0.145 7 $15.88
R 10 0.625 0.000 0.203 11 $16.12
R 11 0.750 0.625 0.920 22 $31.00
R 12 0.750 0.000 0.255 15 $17.06
R 13 0.750 0.125 0.418 18 $19.44
R 14 0.500 0.000 0.160 9 $15.63
aR 15 0.750 1.000 0.937 24 $31.44
R 16 0.750 0.125 0.098 5 $15.38
2 R 17 0.625 0.125 0.242 14 $27.22
2 R 18 0.500 0.000 0.048 3 $28.99
2 R 19 0.375 0.000 0.017 1 $29.44
2 R 20 0.625 0.000 0.152 8 $27.01
2 R 21 0.375 0.000 0.107 6 $28.03
2 R 22 0.500 0.125 0.035 2 $29.19
2 R 23 0.750 0.000 0.055 4 $28.51
2 R 24 0.500 0.125 0.185 10 $26.63
a Separatrix crossing between initial and terminal outcome.
Which equilibrium emerges? Table IV indicates that, by the terminal outcome, one of
Ž . Ž .the 0.6R cohorts 8 , three of the R cohorts 10, 12, and 14 , and five of the 2 R cohorts
Ž .18, 19, 20, 21, and 23 converged to the risk-dominant equilibrium. Conversely, two 0.6R
Ž . Ž .cohorts 2 and 3 respectively and one R cohort 15 converged to the payoff-dominant
equilibrium, while none of the 2 R cohorts converged to the payoff-dominant equilibrium.
Ž .Notice that, given the observed initial conditions, a cohort must cross the best-response
separatrix to converge to the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Cohorts were less likely to
escape from the risk dominant equilibrium’s best-response basin of attraction the larger
the optimization premium. Our results are thus consistent with Hypothesis 3: the
payoff-dominant equilibrium emerged less frequently in treatments with a larger opti-
mization premium.
A nonparametric rank sum test reveals that the observed difference in behavior is
statistically significant. In particular, Table IV ranks the cohorts by the overall frequency
of the payoff-dominant action X. The cohort with the lowest X frequency is 19 and it
receives a rank of 1. The cohort with the highest X frequency is 15 and it receives a rank
of 24. A quick inspection of the rankings reveal that the 2 R cohorts tend to receive single
digit rankings and the 0.6R cohorts all receive double digit rankings.
These rankings can be used to perform the Kruskal-Wallis multiple comparisons test,
Ž Ž ..which is based on the sum of the ranks by treatment Conover 1980, p. 231 . The rank
sum for the 0.6R cohorts is 48, for the R cohorts is 111, and for the 2 R cohorts is 141.
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The null hypothesis is no treatment difference. The test statistic is 11.3, which is
approximately Chi-square. The probability value of 0.0036 rejects the null hypothesis
under all conventional levels of statistical significance.
Given the alternative hypothesis of treatment differences, we proceed to determine
which pairs of treatments differed. Dividing the rank sum by the number of observations,
8, gives the normalized rank sum. The absolute value of the difference in the normalized
rank sum between the 0.6R and R treatments is 7.9 and between 0.6R and 2 R is 11.6.
Both of these values exceed the critical value of 7.5 at the 1 percent level of statistical
significance. Hence, we conclude behavior in the 0.6R treatment was different than in
the other two treatments. The absolute value of the normalized rank sum difference
between the R and 2 R treatments is 3.75, which is not statistically significant.
Figure 6 reports the five-period mean frequency of the payoff-dominant action by
cohort. The three horizontal reference lines denote the frequencies with which X is
Ž . Ž .played in the risk-dominant equilibrium 0.0 , the mixed equilibrium 0.8 , and the
Ž .payoff-dominant equilibrium 1.0 . The figure illustrates two results already derived from
Table IV: Cohorts with a larger optimization premium were more likely to have
converged to an equilibrium by the end of the session, and the payoff-dominant
equilibrium emerged less frequently in treatments with a larger optimization premium.
As seen in Figure 6, it takes a long time to converge to a mutually consistent outcome.
Amongst cohorts that converged to the risk-dominant equilibrium, it takes longer for R
cohorts to reach the risk-dominant equilibrium than it does for 2 R cohorts. If we
Ž .examine the first five period state in which every subject in a cohort plays the
Žrisk-dominant action excluding the R cohorts that never converge to the risk-dominant
.equilibrium , we find that the remaining six R cohorts take an average of 50 periods for
all subjects to reach the risk-dominant equilibrium, while the eight 2 R cohorts take an
Žaverage of 26 periods. Only one 0.6R cohort converges to the risk-dominant equilibrium
.state. It took 58 periods. The evidence is thus consistent with the hypothesis that
reducing the optimization premium reduces the speed of convergence to the inefficient
risk-dominant equilibrium.
The results reported in Figure 6 reflect the qualitative features of our last two
hypotheses. Convergence is more rapid when the optimization premium is larger. The
risk-dominant equilibrium emerges as the customary way to play in all of the 2 R cohorts
and in six out of eight R cohorts. The risk-dominant equilibrium emerged only once in
the eight 0.6R cohorts. Conversely, the payoff-dominant equilibrium emerges as the
customary way to play in two 0.6R cohorts and one R cohort.
The last column of Table IV, reporting average per capita earnings by cohort, provides
insight into the economic significance of these findings. The average subject in cohort 15
earned $31.44, which was the highest average. Cohort 3 is a close second, earning $31.31.
The average subject in cohort 6 earned $12.59, which was the least. A failure to
coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium was thus very costly to subjects in the
0.6R treatments in both absolute terms, about a $19 difference, and in percentage terms,
as cohort 6 earns only 40 percent of cohort 3’s earnings. In contrast, cohorts in the 2 R
treatments lost much less as a result of the observed coordination failures.
4.3. Indiidual Behaior
Our examination of individual behavior begins with an estimation of the relationship
between subjects’ strategy choices and their experience. We first suppose the probability
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that subject i attaches to her opponent playing strategy X, at time t, denoted by q , isit
given by
q dt1I d t2 I dI0 i1 i t2 i t1
q it t1 t2d d  1
where q is the prior probability, I equals one if i’s opponent played X at time  and0 i
zero otherwise, and d is the discount factor. If d1, then this model yields fictitious play
beliefs, and if d0, then we have Cournot beliefs. If we remove the prior, we get
Ž .Cheung and Friedman’s 1997 formulation.
We assume that the probability that subject i chooses strategy X at time t, denoted by
p , is given byit
Ž Ž ..exp 	 
 q q*j j it
p  ,it Ž Ž ..1exp 	 
 q q*j j it
 4where j 2 R, R, 0.6R indexes the games. When 	 0 and 
  , this is the logisticj j j
response function discussed above, where  is the precision parameter and  is thej
optimization premium parameter. The constant term 	 is included to capture a possiblej
tendency to move away from low payoffs, suggested by the data in Table III. Maximum
likelihood estimates, computed using Gauss, are shown in Table V.
The estimated 
 have the expected ordering and are statistically different from each
other: 
 
 
 . Individual subjects are more sensitive to the history of oppo-0.6R R 2 R
nents’ in games with a larger optimization premium.10
Because 
  , the estimated 
 reveal that the precision parameter  is notj j j
constant across treatments. If it were, then not only would 
 
 
 , but 
0.6R R 2 R 0.6 R
would equal 0.6
 , or 3.59, and 
 would equal 2
 , or 11.96. Both 
 and 
 areR 2 R R 0.6 R R
more than two standard errors away from the estimated values, allowing us to reject the
hypothesis of a stable precision parameter across treatments. The sensitivity of actions to
the optimization premium appears to exhibit decreasing returns.
The estimated priors are remarkably close to the observed frequencies. The memory
discount parameter estimates are plausible, but are closer to fictitious play than we
expected.
The constant 	 is significantly positive in all three treatments, indicating a bias inj
favor of the payoff-dominant action. The bias does not appear to vary systematically with
the payoff tables.11 The logistic response model cannot accommodate the observed bias,
as the logistic response function forces players to be indifferent between actions X and Y
Ž .whenever they attach a probability of 0.8 to their opponent’s playing X see Figure 4 ,
while the experimental subjects are significantly more likely to play X under such
10 We obtain analogous results if we impose the restriction that 	 0 and hence work with thej
logistic response function.
11 The aspiration and imitation model lying behind Hypothesis 3 suggests that strategy choices
should be noisier when payoffs are small, and hence should be noisier near the payoff-dominant
than the risk dominant equilibrium, with this difference most pronounced when the optimization
premium is small. Translating these differing noise levels into differences in the trend 	 wouldj
require a richer specification, capturing such features of the aspiration and imitation model as the
importance of an agent’s previous choice and the current population state, though the ability of
noisy choice to translate into an increased likelihood of absorption at the payoff dominant
equilibrium suggests that 	 may be positive and decreasing in the optimization premium.j
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FIGURE 6.Five period mean frequency of X by cohort.
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FIGURE 6.Continued
circumstances. Our individual results are thus consistent with the first two hypotheses
generated by the logistic choice model, but also suggest that the model fails to capture
important aspects of observed behavior. More theoretical and experimental work is
required to assess whether individual behavior matches the predictions of the aspiration
and imitation model.
4.4. Literature Discussion
Experiments involving sequences of stag hunt games have been conducted by Clark,
Ž . Ž . Ž .Kay, and Sefton 1996 , Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross 1992 , Friedman 1996 ,
Ž . Ž .Schmidt, Shupp, Walker, and Ostrom 1997 , and Straub 1995 . As is the case with our
TABLE V
ESTIMATED LOGISTIC RESPONSE MODEL
MEAN LOG-LIKELIHOOD 0.3637; NUMBER OF CASES 14400;
STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES
Treatment j q d 	 
0 j j j j
0.6R 0.64 0.85 1.30 4.49
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .0.05 0.01 0.06 0.15
R 0.68 0.84 1.50 5.98
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .0.04 0.02 0.07 0.16
2 R 0.65 0.89 1.28 6.95
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .0.04 0.01 0.12 0.27
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results, play typically converges to the equilibrium whose best-response basin of attrac-
tion contains the initial outcome, with this equilibrium more likely to be the risk-domi-
nant equilibrium the larger is the latter’s basin of attraction. However, Schmidt, et al.
observe three cases in which play begins in the risk-dominant basin of attraction but
crosses the separatrix to converge to the payoff-dominant equilibrium.
Ž .Rankin, Van Huyck, and Battalio 1999 report an experiment in which subjects play a
sequence of similar games in which payoffs, action labels, and game forms are constantly
changing, forcing subjects to focus on abstract similarities between games. Payoff
dominance emerges as an equilibrium selection principle even when the risk-dominant
equilibrium has an extremely large basin of attraction, with values of q* as large as 0.97.
5. CONCLUSION
Our results provide evidence that more than the best-response correspondence mat-
ters when predicting human behavior in laboratory experiments. We have focused on the
optimization premiumthe expected earnings difference between the two actionsin
three stag hunt games that have the same best-response correspondence, the same mixed
strategy equilibrium, and the same expected payoff at this mixed strategy equilibrium, but
different pecuniary incentives to play a best-response.
We find statistically and economically significant evidence that the optimization
premium helps explain observed behavior. The sensitivity of individual subjects to the
history of opponents’ play is greater in games with a larger optimization premium.
Behavior converges more quickly the larger the optimization premium. The risk-domi-
nant equilibrium is more likely to emerge the larger is the optimization premium.
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